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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay is about what prosecutors can do to ensure 
that prisoners with meritorious legal claims have a remedy.  
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
imposes draconian conditions on when prisoners may file 
successive petitions for post-conviction review (that is, more 
than one petition for post-conviction review).
1
  AEDPA’s 
restrictions on post-conviction review are so severe that they 
routinely prevent prisoners with meritorious claims from 
vindicating those claims. 
Take, for example, the recent litigation about whether 
prisoners with “Johnson” claims may be resentenced. 
Johnson v. United States held that the “residual clause” of 
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutionally 
 
 † Climenko Fellow & Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2017, Harvard Law School. 
 
1
 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (“A second or successive motion must be 
certified . . . to contain—(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and 
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found 
the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2818595 
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vague.
2
  ACCA imposed a mandatory fifteen-year term of 
imprisonment on prisoners; but without ACCA, the statutory 
maximum term of imprisonment for these prisoners is ten 
years.
3
  Johnson therefore means these prisoners could 
lawfully be sentenced to no more than ten years in prison.
4
 
Prisoners whose ACCA sentences depended on the residual 
clause are now seeking to have their 15-year sentences 
reduced to the lawful 10 years.
5
  But three courts of appeal 
held that AEDPA bars prisoners with Johnson claims from 
obtaining relief if they have already filed one petition for 
post-conviction review, because the prisoners do not satisfy 




The United States attempted to avoid this result.
7
  The 
United States urged courts to grant prisoners permission to 
file successive petitions: It waived the argument that 
prisoners who were sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause 
have not satisfied the conditions to file successive petitions 
for post-conviction review.
8
  But some courts still denied 
prisoners permission to file the petitions.
9
  The reason is 
that while litigants generally may “waive”—affirmatively 










 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012). 
 
5
 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012); see generally 
Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s 
Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 
61–62 (2015) [hereinafter Residual Impact] (“A decision finding the residual 
clause invalid would mean that defendants subjected to the enhancement 
received ‘a punishment the law c[ould] not impose on’ thema term of years 
exceeding the statutory maximum for the offense they were convicted of.”). 
 
6
 In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 
1143 (10th Cir. 2015); In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 
7
 The Supreme Court may attempt to avoid this result as well, given that 
it granted a petition for certiorari that raises the question whether Johnson is 
retroactive.  See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016). 
 
8
 Joint Emergency Motion for an Order Authorizing District Court to 
Consider a Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. §2255, United States v. Striet, 
No. 15-72506, at 10–11 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015); Joint Emergency Motion for 
an Order Authorizing District Court to Reconsider a Successive Motion Under 
28 U.S.C. 2255, Reliford v. United States, No. 15-3224, at 10 (8th Cir. Oct. 6, 
2015); Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 
have previously accepted the government’s concession of retroactivity of a new 
Supreme Court rule as a sufficient prima facie showing to allow a second or 
successive § 2255 petition.”). 
 
9
 In re Williams, No 15-30731, Letter Brief of the United States Sept. 24, 
2015, at 6 (“The government does not object to the defendant’s motion for 
leave to file a successive § 2255 motion.”); In re Williams, 806 F.3d at 325–27. 
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litigants cannot waive arguments that go to the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction—the courts’ power and authority to hear 
a case.  And some courts have held that AEDPA’s 
restrictions on post-conviction review are jurisdictional.  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that 
they are.
10
  So too has the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit,
11
 although it is set to take another look at 
this question as a full en banc court this spring.
12
 
This Essay takes up the question of whether the 
threshold requirements for obtaining authorization to file a 
successive petition for post-conviction review are 
jurisdictional.  The Johnson litigation is not the first, nor will 
it be the last, time AEDPA’s restrictions on post-conviction 
review bar prisoners with meritorious claims from obtaining 
relief.  AEDPA’s restrictions are severe, and the United 
States has, outside of the Johnson litigation, previously 
attempted to “waive” the argument that AEDPA’s restrictions 
are not satisfied.
13
  Whether AEDPA’s restrictions are 
jurisdictional dictates whether there is a safety valve—
prosecutorial waiver—that could serve as a mechanism to 
allow prisoners with meritorious claims to obtain relief on 
those claims when AEDPA’s restrictions do not. 
Part I describes AEDPA’s restrictions on post-conviction 
petitions that are preventing prisoners with meritorious 
claims from obtaining relief, and how the United States is 
attempting to bypass those restrictions by waiving the 
argument that AEDPA’s restrictions are not satisfied.  Part II 
argues that AEDPA’s restrictions on filing successive 
petitions for post-conviction review are not jurisdictional, 
and that courts may therefore accept the government’s 
waiver and allow prisoners to obtain relief on their claims 




 See, e.g., Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(“This bar on second or successive motions is jurisdictional.”); id. at 1336–37 
(“Whether a prisoner may bring a . . . petition under the savings clause of  
§ 2255(e) . . . is a threshold jurisdictional issue.”). 
 
11
 United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[I]n 
AEDPA, Congress limited the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear second or 
successive requests . . . . [C]ourts may hear second or successive petitions 
only if” they satisfy the requirements of § 2255(h).); Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 
802, 807–08 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 
12
 Order, United States v. Surratt, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015). 
 
13
 See, e.g., Surratt, 797 F.3d at 246 (“The Government did not oppose 
Surratt’s . . . request.”); Williams, 713 F.3d at 1336 (“The government initially 
conceded . . . that the savings clause applied to the kind of claim Williams 
sought to bring.”). 
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filing successive petitions for post-conviction review. 
I 
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS 
This Part describes AEDPA’s restrictions on successive 
petitions for post-conviction review.  It then describes the 
rules of litigation that generally allow parties to waive 
arguments on which they might prevail. 
A. Restrictions 
AEDPA severely limits prisoners’ ability to file “second or 
successive” petitions for post-conviction review—review that 
occurs after a defendant’s conviction has become final.  If a 
prisoner has already filed one petition for post-conviction 
review, the prisoner may file another petition only if he 
obtains authorization from the court of appeals.
14
  And 
AEDPA provides that a court of appeals may grant 
authorization to file a successive petition in only extremely 
limited circumstances—if “the applicant shows that the 
claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court”
15
; or “the factual predicate for the claim could not 
have been discovered previously through the exercise of due 
diligence and”
16
 “the facts underlying the claim . . . would be 
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found the 
applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
17
 
AEDPA’s restrictions on post-conviction review pose a 
substantial barrier to litigants seeking to file a successive 
petition for post-conviction review.  The Supreme Court 
rarely “makes” new rules retroactive to cases on post-
conviction review.  In the last fifteen years, the Supreme 
Court has held that two rules are retroactive.
18
  Nor is it easy 
to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that “no 




 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (“Before a second or successive application 
permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move 
in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court 
to consider the application.”). 
 
15
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) 
 
16
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) 
 
17
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 
18
 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732-36 (2016); Welch v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265-68 (2016). 
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guilty.”
19
  The Court has described the clear-and-convincing 
standard as “stringent.”
20
 At least one case illustrates the 
kind of showing that might satisfy the clear-and-convincing 
gatekeeping requirement.  In House v. Bell, the Court found 
that it was “more likely than not” that no reasonable 
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty of the 
offense.
21
  Because the question in that case concerned the 
defendant’s procedural default—the failure to raise a claim 
earlier—as opposed to his ability to file a successive petition, 
the defendant had to show only that it was “more likely than 
not” that no factfinder would have found him guilty in order 
to present his otherwise procedurally defaulted claim.  The 
Court concluded the following evidence made it “more likely 
than not” that no reasonable jury would have found the 
defendant guilty: Subsequent testing revealed the purported 
DNA match was incorrect—the DNA at the crime scene came 
from someone other than the defendant; the blood stains on 
the defendant’s clothes came from blood from the crime lab, 
rather than from the crime scene; and several individuals 
testified that someone other than the defendant had 
confessed to the crime.
22
 
All this is to say that it is hard—and sometimes 
prohibitively so—for a prisoner to meet the threshold 
requirements for obtaining authorization to file a second or 
successive petition in the court of appeals.  Take the recent 
litigation over who can be resentenced in light of Johnson v. 
United States.  Johnson held that ACCA’s “residual clause” 
was unconstitutionally vague.
23
  Defendants sentenced 
under the residual clause were subject to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years.
24
  Without 
the ACCA mandatory minimum, however, the statutory 
maximum term of imprisonment for their offense of 
conviction was ten years.
25
  Many federal prisoners are 




 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). 
 
20
 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326–27 (1995). 
 
21
 See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006).  House also held the petitioner 
had not made the more “persuasive showing” of actual innocence that might 
be required to maintain a freestanding claim of actual innocence.  Whether 
that more persuasive showing is higher than clear and convincing evidence is 
not clear.  Id. at 554–55; see, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 
22
 House, 547 U.S. at 540–53. 
 
23
 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 
24
 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 
25
 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012); see generally Litman, Residual Impact, 
supra note 5, at 61–62. 
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sentences reduced to their lawful terms. 
Prisoners who were sentenced under ACCA’s residual 
clause have Johnson claims—they were sentenced under an 
unconstitutional sentencing enhancement and received a 
term of imprisonment at least five years longer than the 
statutory maximum term of imprisonment.  Moreover, 
Johnson is the kind of rule that is clearly retroactive and 
applies to convictions that have already become final.
26
  
“New” constitutional rules generally do not apply to criminal 
cases that have already become final, but a new 
constitutional rule applies retroactively—to convictions that 
have already become final—if the new rule is “substantive.”
27
  
The Supreme Court has said that “any fact that increases 
the mandatory minimum” sentence is an “element” of a 
criminal offense: “[A] fact triggering [a] mandatory 
minimum . . . constitute[s] a new, aggravated crime.”
28
  It 
has also said that a decision that “modifies the elements of 
an offense is normally substantive rather than procedural.”
29
  
By changing who is eligible for a mandatory minimum 
sentence, Johnson modified the elements of a criminal 
offense.  The Court has also said that substantive rules are 
rules that create “a significant risk that a defendant . . . 
faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”
30
  
And Johnson means that defendants sentenced under 
ACCA’s residual clause received “a punishment the law 
c[ould] not impose on” them—a term of years exceeding the 
statutory maximum for their offense of conviction.
31
  
Moreover, without the ACCA enhancement, the statutory 
maximum term of imprisonment for a conviction under § 
924(a)(2) is ten years, whereas with the enhancement, the 




 One of us has explained this argument more in depth elsewhere.  See, 
e.g., Litman, Residual Impact, supra note 5, at 61–63 (2015); Leah M. Litman, 
Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SEN’G REP. 
45, 47 (2015) [hereinafter Resentencing in the Shadow]. 
 
27
 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (“[A] new rule should be 
applied retroactively if it places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe.’”); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004) 
(“[Substantive] rules apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry a 
significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does 




 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2158, 2160–61 (2013). 
 
29
 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 354. 
 
30
 Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
 
31
 See id. 
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fifteen years. 
But there is a difference between Johnson being 
retroactive and the Supreme Court “making” it retroactive.  
To prevail on a first petition for post-conviction review, a 
prisoner has to show only that Johnson is retroactive.  But 
to obtain authorization to file a successive petition for post-
conviction review, a prisoner must show that Johnson has 
been made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
32
  Tyler v. Cain 
held that the Court can “make” a rule retroactive only 
through “holdings” rather than dicta.  To establish that a 
rule has been “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court,” 
Tyler explained, a prisoner generally must show that “the 
Supreme Court h[eld] it to be retroactive.”
33
  Tyler then came 
close to suggesting that the Supreme Court can “make” a 
rule retroactive only by issuing a decision holding that rule 
retroactive or applying that rule to a case on collateral 
review.
34
  And prior to April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court 
had not yet done so for the rule in Johnson.  No matter what 
it means to “make” or “hold” a rule retroactive, however, the 
important point here is that there is some conceptual space 
between a rule being retroactive and the Supreme Court 
making it so. 
There is also a narrow window in which the Supreme 
Court must “make” a new rule retroactive: The Court must 
make a new rule retroactive within one year of announcing 
the new rule in order for a prisoner’s successive petition not 
to be time-barred.  Prisoners have one year to file a 
successive petition from “the date on which the 
constitutional right [the prisoner] assert[ed] was initially 
recognized by the Supreme Court.”
35
  Dodd v. United States 
held that the statute of limitations period begins when the 
Court recognizes the new right, not when it makes the right 
retroactive, even though prisoners must also show the 
Supreme Court has made a right retroactive in order to 
receive authorization to file a successive petition.
36
  “[A]n 
applicant who files a second or successive motion seeking to 
take advantage of a new rule of constitutional law will be 
time barred except in the rare case in which this Court 




 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); see Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001) 
(interpreting identically worded provision in § 2244). 
 
33
 Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666. 
 
34
 See id.; Litman, Resentencing in the Shadow, supra note  26, at 48–49. 
 
35
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2012). 
 
36
 545 U.S. 353, 357–59 (2005). 
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retroactive within one year.”
37
 
Relying on Tyler, some courts of appeals held that, 
because the Supreme Court had not “made” Johnson 
retroactive, prisoners were not permitted to file a successive 
petition for post-conviction review based on Johnson if they 
have already filed one petition for post-conviction review.
38
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied 
authorization to file second or successive petitions.
39
  So too 
did U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
40
 and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
41
  The law in these 
circuits, therefore, did not permit prisoners who have 
already filed one petition for post-conviction review to have 
their sentences reduced to the lawful ten years.
42
  Rather, 
these prisoners may have had to serve the entirety of their 
fifteen-year term. 
B. The Possibility of Waiver 
The government tried to avoid this result.  The United 
States urged courts to grant prisoners authorization to file 
successive petitions for post-conviction review.  That is, the 
government attempted to waive the argument that the 
Supreme Court has not “made” Johnson retroactive so that 
courts may grant prisoners permission to file successive 










 Tyler, 553 U.S. at 666. 
 
39
 In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 
40
 In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 
41
 In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 
42
 Two decisions denying authorization to file second or successive 
petitions—one from the Fifth Circuit and one from the Eleventh Circuit—
suggested that Johnson might not be retroactive at all.  The Fifth Circuit in In 
re Williams stated that “Johnson is not available . . . on collateral review” 
because it was not a substantive rule.  806 F.3d at 326.  And the Eleventh 
Circuit in In re Rivero maintained that “the rule announced in Johnson does 
not meet the criteria the Supreme Court uses to determine whether the 
retroactivity exception for new substantive rules applies.”  797 F.3d at 989.  
However, no court of appeals has held Johnson is not retroactive in a case that 
does not involve an application for a second or successive petition for post-
conviction review.  One district court in the Fifth Circuit did.  See Harrimon v. 
United States, No. 15-cv-00152, D.E. No. 9 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2015). 
 
43
 Joint Emergency Motion for an Order Authorizing District Court to 
Consider a Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, United States v. Striet, 
No. 15-72506, at 10–11 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015); Joint Emergency Motion for 
an Order Authorizing District Court to Reconsider a Successive Motion Under 
28 U.S.C. 2255, Reliford v. United States, No. 15-3224, at 10 (8th Cir. Oct. 6, 
2015); Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 
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In some respects, this is unremarkable.  Litigants are 
not required to make every possible argument on which they 
might prevail; litigants “waive” and “forfeit” arguments all 
the time.  A litigant “forfeits” an argument by failing to raise 
the argument, or failing to raise it at the correct time in the 
litigation.
44
  And under the well-established doctrine of 
“forfeiture,” courts can decline to consider forfeited 
arguments, or they may consider them under a more 
demanding legal standard.
45
  But courts will rarely, if ever, 
raise or consider arguments that litigants have “waived.”  A 
litigant “waives” an argument by affirmatively declining to 
make it, or affirmatively indicating the argument lacks 
merit.
46
  And courts will not consider arguments that have 
been waived because these are arguments that litigants have 
deliberately and voluntarily refused to pursue.
47
  Thus, even 
if an argument is right, a litigant might not prevail on the 
argument if she has failed to raise it, or has affirmatively 
declined to make it.  Forfeiture and waiver are routinely 
invoked in criminal cases, often against defendants and to 
affirm convictions.
48
  But waiver and forfeiture are also 




Indeed, one reason why prisoners are obtaining relief in 
their first petitions for post-conviction review is because the 
government is waiving objections to resentencing.  That is, 
the government agrees that prisoners who were sentenced 
 
have previously accepted the government’s concession of retroactivity of a new 
Supreme Court rule as a sufficient prima facie showing to allow a second or 
successive § 2255 petition.”); Leah M. Litman, The Extraordinary 
Circumstances Of Johnson v. United States, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 81, 87–89 (2016) [hereinafter The Extraordinary Circumstances]. 
 
44
 E.g., Guyan Int’l, Inc. v. Prof’l Benefits Adm’rs, Inc., 689 F.3d 793, 799 




 E.g., Usman v. Holder, 566 F.3d 262, 268 (1st Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Moore, 376 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 
46
 E.g., Usman, 566 F.3d at 268; Moore, 376 F.3d 570. 
 
47
 See Wood v. Milyard, 132. S. Ct. 1826, 1830 (2012) (“A court is not at 
liberty, we have cautioned, to bypass, override, or excuse a State’s deliberate 
waiver of a limitations defense.”); see also United States v. Clements, 590 
F.App’x 446, 449 (Oct. 22, 2014) (“While a party who waives evidentiary 
objections may not seek review of them at all, a party who fails to object to the 
introduction of evidence may seek plain-error review of the forfeited 
objection.”); United States v. Walker, 615 F.3d 728, 733 (6th Cir. 2010) (“But 
Walker did not just forfeit this argument; he waived it.”). 
 
48
 See sources cited supra notes 43 and 44. 
 
49
 United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 527 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 
government, like other litigants, therefore, can forfeit or waive an argument.”). 
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under ACCA’s residual clause should be resentenced to their 
lawful ten-year terms of imprisonment.
50
  It was conceding 
that Johnson is retroactive and waiving that objection to 
resentencing.
51
  And many courts that are ordering 
defendants to be resentenced are doing so specifically on the 




But there is a big exception to the general rules about 
waiver and forfeiture: “Jurisdictional” rules may not be 
waived or forfeited.
53
  A rule is jurisdictional if it affects the 
court’s power and authority to hear a case.
54
  And courts 
must raise jurisdictional arguments on their own; parties 
cannot consent, waive, or forfeit their way into federal 
court.
55
  A court’s “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction can never be 
waived or forfeited”; “objections [to jurisdiction] may be 
resurrected at any point in the litigation”; and courts must 





JURISDICTIONAL OR NOT? 
The government attempted to waive the argument that 
the Supreme Court has not “made” Johnson retroactive so 
that courts may grant prisoners permission to file successive 




 See sources cited supra notes 43. 
 
51
 See, e.g., Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (“Here, the United States concedes that Johnson is retroactive.”); 
Tooley v. United States, No. 05-00211-01-CR-W-FG, 2015 WL 7758973, at *1 
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 1, 2015) (“The Court further finds, again without objection 
from the parties, that Johnson constitutes a new substantive rule of 
constitutional law that should be applied retroactively to defendants previously 
sentenced under the ACCA.”); United States v. Nagy, No. 5:13-CR-138, 2015 
WL 6870120, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 6, 2015); Brief of United States in United 
States v. Imm, No. 14-4809, at 5 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (“The government 
further waives any objection based on procedural default.”); United States v. 
Schultz, No. CR 13-214, 2015 WL 5853117, at *1 (D. Minn.  Oct. 7, 2015) 
(“The United States of America (the “Government”) does not oppose the 
motion.”); Godley v. United States, No. 4:05-CR-17-FL-1, 2015 WL 5155967, at 
*2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 2015); United States v. Hamilton, No. 06CR200-01, 2015 
WL 5011450, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2015). 
 
52
 See sources cited supra note 51. 
 
53
 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 
 
54
 E.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160–61 (2010). 
 
55
 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; see also Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 
428, 435 (2011) (“[A] party may raise . . . a [jurisdictional] objection even if the 
party had previously acknowledged the trial court’s jurisdiction.”). 
 
56
 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 647–48 (2012). 
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imprisonment.
57
  But some courts did not accept these 
concessions.
58
  And they may have refused to do so in part 
because some precedent suggests that the threshold 
requirements for obtaining permission to file a successive 
petition for post-conviction review are jurisdictional. 
This Part suggests that view is mistaken.  Over the last 
three decades, the Supreme Court has established and 
consistently applied a very demanding clear statement rule 
to determine whether a statutory requirement is 
jurisdictional.  Section II.A outlines those precedents, and 
Section II.B surveys the reasons to think that the 
gatekeeping requirements for obtaining a successive petition 
for post-conviction review are not jurisdictional. 
A. Arbaugh’s Clear Statement Rule 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. established an “administrable 
bright line” rule for when a statutory requirement is 
jurisdictional: Unless the “Legislature clearly states that a 
threshold limitation . . . shall count as jurisdictional,” courts 
“should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in 
character.”
59
  “[T]he term ‘jurisdictional,’” the Court has 
explained, “properly applies only to ‘prescriptions delineating 
the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the 




In the last two decades, the Court has relied on 
Arbaugh’s clear-statement rule to hold many statutory 
requirements not jurisdictional.
61




 See sources cited supra note 6. 
 
58
 See sources cited supra note 8. 
 
59
 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16. 
 
60
 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). 
 
61
 See, e.g., United States. v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1633 
(2015) (statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and does not “in any way 
cabin [a court’s] usual equitable powers”); Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 
428, 429 (2011) (120-day deadline for filing notice of appeal with Veterans 
Court was not jurisdictional); Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 
S. Ct. 817, 818 (2013) (180-day period to file Medicare appeal not 
jurisdictional).  The two exceptions are Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), 
and John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008).  Bowles 
held the time to file an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2017(a) is jurisdictional, 
noting the fact that “this Court has long held that the taking of an appeal 
within the prescribed amount of time is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”  551 
U.S. at 209–10.  John R. Sand held that courts were required, on their own, to 
determine whether parties had complied with the statute of limitations 
governing suits against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims.  552 
U.S. at 133–34.  John R. Sand, however, was more a question of statutory 
stare decisis, given that the Court suggested the petitioner could “succeed only 
102 CORNELL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol.101:91 
“pressed a stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional 
rules, which govern ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority,’ and 
nonjurisdictional ‘claim-processing rules,’ which do not.”
62
  
In applying Arbaugh’s clear-statement principle, the Court 
has repeatedly recited the practical considerations that 
counsel against finding a statutory requirement 
jurisdictional: Once a limit is jurisdictional, “waiver becomes 
impossible, meritorious excuse irrelevant (unless the statute 
so provides), and sua sponte consideration in the courts of 
appeals mandatory”;
63
 “tardy jurisdictional objections” waste 




The reasoning in Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick is 
illustrative.  Reed held that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)’s requirement 
that no copyright infringement suit “shall be instituted until 
preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has 
been made” was a nonjurisdictional precondition to filing 
suit.
65
  Reed reasoned that the phrase “no civil action . . . 
shall be instituted until preregistration” “[did] not speak in 
jurisdictional terms.”
66
  Reed also noted that the registration 
requirement appeared in a “provision ‘separate’ from those 
granting federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction”; that the 
statute allows courts to adjudicate some civil actions where 
there was no preregistration; and that the “legal character” 
of the registration requirement was not jurisdictional.
67
 
The Court decided Gonzalez v. Thaler against this 
backdrop.  In Gonzalez, the Court examined whether 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c), the AEDPA provision outlining the 
requirements for appealing a district court’s ruling on a  
§ 2255 petition, was jurisdictional. Section 2253(c)(1) reads: 
“Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 
appealability [COA], an appeal may not be taken to the court 
of appeals . . . .”
68
  The Court held that this provision was 
jurisdictional; that is, without a certificate of appealability, 
the court of appeals does not have subject-matter 
 
by convincing us that this Court has overturned, or that it should now 
overturn, its earlier precedent.”  Id. at 136. 
 
62
 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012). 
 
63
 Bowles, 551 U.S. at 216–17 (2007). 
 
64
 Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824. 
 
65
 559 U.S. 154, 163 (2010). 
 
66




 Id. at 164–66. 
 
68
 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012). 
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jurisdiction over the appeal.
69
  But it held that both sections 
2253(c)(2) and 2253(c)(3), which state “threshold condition[s] 
for the issuance of a COA,” were nonjurisdictional.
70
  Section 
2253(c)(2) provides that, “[a] certificate of appealability may 
issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”; 
section 2253(c)(3) states that “[t]he certificate of appealability 
under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or 
issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).”
71
  The 
Court summarized the significance of the provisions as 
follows: “[T]he failure to obtain a COA is jurisdictional, while 
a COA’s failure to indicate an issue is not.  A defective COA 
is not equivalent to the lack of any COA.”
72
 
B. Second or Successive Petitions 
The same is true for orders granting authorization to file 
successive petitions and the conditions for issuing those 
orders.  The threshold conditions for granting authorization 
to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief—in 
sections 2255(h)(1) and 2255(h)(2)—are not jurisdictional, 
even if the issuance of the order authorizing the successive 
petition is jurisdictional.  This Section examines the two 
provisions—section 2244(b) and section 2255(h)—that are 
most relevant to when successive petitions may be granted. 
1. Section 2244 
Numerous courts—including the Supreme Court—have 
suggested that the failure “to receive authorization from the 
Court of Appeals before filing” a successive petition deprives 
a district court of “jurisdiction to entertain” the successive 
petition.
73
  Several courts have suggested that section 2244 
is what makes an order authorizing a successive petition 
jurisdictional.
74










 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2),(3); Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 648. 
 
72
 Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 649. 
 
73
 Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007). 
 
74
 E.g., Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 637 (1998) (second or 
successive motion must comply with § 2244(b)(3)(A) to grant jurisdiction); 
Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 149 (2007) (failure of second or successive 
motion to comply with § 2244(b) “deprived the District Court of jurisdiction”); 
Schwartz v. Neal, 228 F. App’x 814, 815 (10th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“He 
failed to obtain this authorization.  See 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A).  Therefore, the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”); United States v. Key, 205 
F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[Section] 2244(b)(3)(A) acts as a jurisdictional 
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2244 by reference: It provides that a successive motion must 
be “certified as provided in section 2244.”
75
  And section 
2244 provides that “[b]efore a second or successive 
application permitted by this section is filed in the district 
court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of 




Assuming that section 2244(b)(3)(A) makes the issuance 
of an order authorizing a successive petition jurisdictional,
77
 
it does not follow that the threshold requirements for the 
issuance of the order are jurisdictional.  Indeed, there are 
several reasons to think they are not. 
First, the text and statutory structure of section 2255(h) 
and 2244(b)(3)(C) suggest that the provisions are not 
jurisdictional.  Section 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(C) “do[] not 
speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the 
jurisdiction of the district courts.”
78
  Rather, section 2255(h) 
provides that a successive motion “must be certified as 
provided in section 2244 . . . to contain” either a new rule of 
constitutional law or newly discovered evidence.
79
  And 
section 2244(b)(3)(C) provides only that a court of appeals 
“may authorize the filing of a second or successive 
application only if it determines that the application makes a 
prima facie showing that the application satisfies the 
requirements of this subsection.”
80
  These provisions thus 
speak to when an order authorizing a successive petition 
may be granted, rather than to the district court’s authority 




bar.”); United States v. Howard, No. CR 6:02-38-DCR, 2015 WL 5612001, at *1 
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2015); Simpson v. Cross, No. 15-CV-817-DRJ-CJP, 2015 
WL 5585809 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2015). 
 
75
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) 
 
76
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 
 
77
 E.g., El-Amin v. United States, 172 F. App’x 942, 946 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]ithout authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a 
second or successive motion.”  (citing United States v. Farris, 333 F3d 1211, 
1216 (11th Cir. 2003))). 
 
78
 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006). 
 
79
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 
 
80
 The “requirements of this subsection” likely refers to § 2244(b)(2), which 
lays out the two grounds on which a second or successive motion can be 
certified.  See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007). 
 
81
 Congress also specifically allowed courts to entertain successive 
petitions in some circumstances—where the remedy provided by section 2255 
is inadequate or ineffective.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 165 (2010) (“Nor does any other factor suggest 
that . . . [the] registration requirement can be read to ‘speak in jurisdictional 
terms . . .’ First, and most significantly, [the statute] expressly allows courts to 
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The requirements for issuing the authorization order 
also appear in a different subsection, and use different 
language, from the jurisdictional provision in section 
2244(b)(3)(A).  Section 2244(b)(3)(A) speaks to what must 
happen for “the district court” to be “authorize[d]” to hear a 
successive petition.
82
 The language referring to the district 
court’s authority is absent from both sections 2255(h) and 
2244(b)(3)(C).  Section 2255(h) speaks only of what the 
“successive motion must be certified . . . to contain.”  And 
section 2244(b)(3)(C) speaks to what a court of appeals must 
determine before “authoriz[ing] the filing of . . . a successive 
application.”  The absence of similar jurisdictional language 
in sections 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(C)—and their placement 
in subsections separate from the jurisdictional provision in 
subsection 2244(b)(3)(A)—suggests that sections 2255(h) and 
2244(b)(3)(C) are not jurisdictional.
83
 
An analogy to Gonzalez helps to clarify why section 
2244(b)(3)(C) in particular is not jurisdictional.  Gonzalez 
held that while section 2253(c)(1)’s requirement of a COA 
was jurisdictional, section 2253(c)(2)’s requirements for 
when a COA may issue were not.  Section 2253(c)(1) 
provides that “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken,” and 
section 2253(c)(2) provides that “[a] certificate of 
appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.”  Section 2253(c)(2), Gonzalez reasoned, 
 




 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 
 
83
 The provisions are also separated from section 2255(e).  Section 2255(e) 
states that a petition for habeas corpus under 2241 “shall not be entertained” 
unless the remedy provided in section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective.  28 
U.S.C. § 2255(e).  Some courts have held that section 2255(e) is jurisdictional.  
See, e.g., United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2015); Williams 
v. Warden, 713 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 2013); Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 
F.3d 538, 557 (10th Cir. 2013).  Moreover, in cases predating Arbaugh, the 
Court suggested an identically worded provision governing post-conviction 
remedies for prisoners convicted in D.C. courts deprived federal courts of 
jurisdiction to hear petitions for post-conviction review filed by such prisoners.  
See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 376 (1977) (referring to D.C. Code § 
23-110(g) as “statutory curtailment of the District Court’s jurisdiction”); 
Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Section 23-110(g)’s plain 
language makes clear that it . . . divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear 
habeas petitions.”); D.C. Code § 23-110(g) (“An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion 
pursuant to this section shall not be entertained . . . unless it also appears 
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 
detention.”). 
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“speaks only to when a COA may issue” and “does not 
contain § 2253(c)(1)’s jurisdictional terms.”
84
 
The similarities between sections 2244 and 2253 are 
telling.  Both section 2253(c)(1) and section 2244(b)(3)(A) 
make particular orders jurisdictional—an order authorizing 
an appeal (section 2253), and an order authorizing the 
district court to consider a successive petition (section 
2244).  Both sections also have neighboring subsections that 
speak to when the relevant orders may be issued.  In fact, 
both neighboring subsections—sections 2253(c)(2) and 
2244(b)(3)(C)—provide that an order “may issue . . . only if ”  
certain conditions are met.  But “[s]ubstantive shortcomings” 
with a petition for post-conviction review “do not affect 
subject matter jurisdiction.”
85
  And while the language in 
sections 2255 and 2244 is mandatory, “most” statutory 




Gonzalez rejected the argument that section 2253(c)(3) is 
jurisdictional because it refers to a jurisdictional provision 
(section 2253(c)(1)), and speaks to when a jurisdiction-
conferring order can be granted.  The Court found it 
significant that Congress “set off the requirements in distinct 
paragraphs and, rather than mirroring their terms, excluded 
the jurisdictional terms in one from the other.”
87
  Congress 
did the same thing here.  While section 2244(b)(3)(A) states 
that an applicant must apply for a COA before he or she 
even files a second or successive motion in district court, 
section 2244(b)(3)(C) says nothing about when an applicant 
may file a second or successive motion.  All that provision 
does is, like the nonjurisdictional section 2253(c)(2), specify 




While one subsection of 2244(b)(3) may be 
jurisdictional—2244(b)(3)(A)—that does not mean other 
subsections like 2244(b)(3)(C) are as well.  “A requirement 
[the Court] would otherwise classify as nonjurisdictional . . . 
does not become jurisdictional simply because it is placed in 




 Gonzalez v. Thayer, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 
85
 Harris v. Warden, 425 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir 2005). 
 
86
 United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015). 
Mandatory requirements also do not become jurisdiction when they are 
“important (most are).”  Id. 
 
87
 Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct at 651. 
 
88
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). 
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provisions.”
89
  And Gonzalez found that one subsection—
section 2253(c)(2)—was not jurisdictional, even though 
another subsection—section 2253(c)(1)—was.  Gonzalez 
reasoned, “Mere proximity will not turn a rule that speaks in 
nonjurisdictional terms into a jurisdictional hurdle.”
90
  In 
fact, Gonzalez suggested that a subsection’s proximity to 
what is clearly a jurisdictional subsection highlights the 
distinction between the two.
91
 
Second, statutory context reinforces that the 
requirements in sections 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(C) are not 
jurisdictional.  Section 2244(b)(4) directs district courts to 
“dismiss any claim presented in a . . . successive 
application . . . unless the applicant shows that the claim 
satisfies the requirements of this section.”
92
  If the 
“requirements of” section 2244—the preconditions for 
granting authorization to file a successive petition—were 
jurisdictional, section 2244(b)(4) would be superfluous.  
District courts and courts of appeal always must assess 
their own jurisdiction: If the preconditions for issuing a 
successive petition were jurisdictional, courts would need to 
assure themselves that the preconditions were satisfied 
whether or not section 2244(b)(4) directed them to do so.
93
  
And courts generally do not “treat statutory terms as 




Third, the “legal character” of the requirements 
contained in sections 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(C) does not 
suggest they are jurisdictional.
95
  Jones v. Bock held that the 
exhaustion requirement contained in the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act was not jurisdictional because although the 
requirement was framed in mandatory terms—”no action . . . 
shall be brought . . . until . . . administrative remedies . . . 
are exhausted”
96
—exhaustion is “typically regard[ed] . . . as 
an affirmative defense.”
97
  The Supreme Court has described 




 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 825 (2013). 
 
90






 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). 
 
93
 See sources cited supra notes 49, 51. 
 
94
 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 
U.S. 687, 698 (1995). 
 
95
 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010). 
 
96
 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
 
97
 549 U.S. 199, 211, 212 (2007). 
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res judicata rule.”
98
  And traditional “principles rank res 
judicata as an affirmative defense ordinarily lost if not timely 
raised,” not as a jurisdictional requirement.
99
  The rules 
governing section 2254 and 2255 proceedings further 
suggest that the conditions on successive petitions are 
affirmative defenses, rather than jurisdictional limitations.  
Rule 5(b), for example, directs the United States in a section 
2255 proceeding to state whether the moving party has 
brought a previous post-conviction motion.
100
  But if the 
preconditions for a successive post-conviction motion were 
jurisdictional, courts would need to ascertain this for 
themselves. 
The legal character of the conditions themselves also 
suggest the conditions do not affect the court’s jurisdiction.  
Take the requirement that a successive petition contain a 
“new rule, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court.”
101
  Whether a rule is retroactive does 
not affect the habeas court’s jurisdiction; litigants are free to 
waive the argument that a new rule is not retroactive.
102
 
The preconditions for successive petitions are also too 
bound up with merits or remedial determinations to be 
jurisdictional.  Gonzalez reasoned that “it would be passing 
strange if, after a COA has issued, each court of appeals 
adjudicating an appeal were dutybound to revisit the 
threshold showing” of whether a petition had a substantial 
claim because “[t]hat inquiry would be largely duplicative of 
the merits.”
103
  So too with respect to retroactivity.  The 
parties are likely to litigate whether any new rule that a 
prisoner relies on applies retroactively to cases that have 
already become final, and courts, in the course of 
adjudicating the petitions, will determine whether a new rule 
applies retroactively.  It would be odd if “each court . . . 




 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (2001). 
 
99
 Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 410 (2000); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(c) (listing res judicata as an affirmative defense). 
 
100
 Habeas Rule 5(b).  Rule 5(b) directs the State in a section 2255 
proceeding to state whether the petition is barred by non-retroactivity, a 
condition listed in section 2244(b)(3)(C). 
 
101
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). 
 
102
 Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (“[A] State can waive the 
Teague bar by not raising it . . . .”).  The habeas rules also place retroactivity 
“on a par with” other affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, 
failure to exhaust state remedies, or other procedural bars. See Day v. 
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006). 
 
103
 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012). 
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threshold showing” of retroactivity, which would be partially 
“duplicative of the . . . question before the court”—namely, 
whether principles of retroactivity entitled a prisoner to relief 
on a new rule of constitutional law.
104
 
Fourth, turning the preconditions for successive 
petitions into jurisdictional requirements would make post-
conviction litigation more unwieldy, not less.  Gonzalez 
declared that Congress’s “intent in AEDPA [was] ‘to eliminate 
delays in the federal habeas review process.’”
105
  But finding 
sections 2244(b)(3)(C) and 2255(h)(2) jurisdictional would 
undermine that goal: Doing so would allow the government 
to raise preconditions as reasons to deny petitions that 
courts have already adjudicated.  Finding sections 
2244(b)(3)(C) and 2255(h)(2) jurisdictional would also add to 
the number of determinations that courts would have to 
make at every stage in the litigation.
106
 
Fifth, the Court has invoked an arguably stronger 
version of Arbaugh’s clear statement rule in cases governing 
post-conviction review.  Holland v. Florida held that AEDPA’s 




 Id.  The same is true for the condition that a prisoner show that “newly 
discovered evidence . . . would be sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the 
movant guilty of the offense.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1).  Each court would be 
effectively dutybound to determine whether a petitioner established he or she 
was prejudiced by the constitutional violation—a question courts decide in the 
course of adjudicating a petition on the merits.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. 
 
105




 In AEDPA, these limitations were added in a section labeled “limits on 
second or successive applications.”  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 106, 110 Stat. 1220 (1996).  Other 
sections of the Act, however, were explicitly labeled as jurisdictional.  E.g., § 
221, 110 Stat. at 1241 (“Jurisdiction for lawsuits against terrorist states.”).  
Additionally, “Congress roundly rejected an amendment to the bill eventually 
adopted that directly invoked the text of the jurisdictional grant.”  Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378, 379 n.10 (Stevens, J. concurring).  A proposed 
amendment would have provided that: “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to a judgment or order of a State court shall not be entertained by a 
court of the United States unless the remedies in the courts of the State are 
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the person’s detention.”  141 
Cong. Rec. S7829 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (amendment of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis 
added).  Criticizing the amendment, Senator Specter explained that when 
“dealing with the question of jurisdiction of the Federal courts to entertain 
questions on Federal issues, on constitutional issues, I believe it is necessary 
that the Federal courts retain that jurisdiction as a constitutional matter.”  Id. 
at S7834 (emphasis added).  The amendment failed to pass, with sixty-one 
senators voting against it.  Id. at 7849. 
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jurisdictional.
107
  Holland reasoned: “[E[quitable principles 
have traditionally governed the substantive law of habeas 
corpus,” and courts should not “construe a statute to 
displace courts’ traditional equitable authority absent the 
clearest command.”
108
  Thus, while AEDPA sought to 
eliminate delays in federal post-conviction review, it sought 
“to do so without undermining basic habeas corpus 
principles . . . . [I]t did so without losing sight of the fact that 




Sixth, interpreting the preconditions for successive 
petitions as jurisdictional would foreclose a potentially viable 
way for prosecutorial discretion to curb the severe statutory 
restrictions on post-conviction review.  If the preconditions 
are jurisdictional, state and federal prosecutors could never 
choose to exercise their discretion and allow prisoners to file 
successive petitions even if the prisoners do not satisfy the 
preconditions for doing so.  That is precisely what is 
happening in the Johnson litigation.  Scholars have argued 
that the executive’s “monopoly on enforcement of the laws 
allows the president to use prosecutorial discretion to 
protect . . . vulnerable population[s]” and “advance 
libertarian and egalitarian values.”
110
  Prosecutorial 
discretion has many downsides, but in this case, it may be a 
potential upside: Discretion allows federal and state 
prosecutors to elect not to enforce the stringent statutory 
restrictions on successive petitions for post-conviction 
review that prevent prisoners with meritorious claims from 
obtaining relief. 
Seventh, the restrictions on post-conviction petitions—
including those on successive petitions—are separate from 
the general grants of jurisdiction to district courts.
111
  
Describing AEDPA’s restrictions on post-conviction petitions, 
the Court wrote in Williams v. Taylor that while “the federal 




 560 U.S. 631 (2010). 
 
108
 Id. at 646 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
109
 Id. at 648–49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
110
 E.g., Roderick M. Hills, Arizona v. United States: The Unitary 
Executive’s Enforcement Discretion As A Limit On Federalism, 11-2 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 189, 191–92 (1992) 
 
111
 See, e.g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1633 (2015) 
(“This Court has often explained that Congress’s separation of a filing deadline 
from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not jurisdictional.” 
(citing cases)). 
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scope of that jurisdictional grant remains the same.”
112
  
Williams referred to section 2241 as the jurisdictional 
grant.
113
  Section 2241 provides that “[w]rits of habeas 
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice 
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their 
respective jurisdictions[,]”
114
 a separate section from the 
restrictions on successive petitions, which are contained in 
sections 2255(h) and 2244.  Section 2255(a) also generally 
allows for prisoners in custody to file a motion “to vacate, set 
aside or correct the sentence.”
115
  Judge Easterbrook in 
Webster v. Caraway identified several other potential sources 
of subject-matter jurisdiction for second or successive 
petitions, including section 1331, the statute providing 
district courts with jurisdiction over cases arising under 
federal law; section 1343(a)(4), on the theory that habeas 
petitions are, in some ways, civil rights claims; and section 




Nor does section 2244(a) generally circumscribe this 
jurisdiction with respect to second or successive petitions.  
Section 2244(a) provides that “[n]o circuit or district judge 
shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus . . . if it appears that the legality of such 
detention has been determined by a judge or court of the 
United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas 
corpus, except as provided in section 2255.”
117
  But that 
does not make every restriction on successive petitions 
jurisdictional, for all of the reasons discussed in this section.  
Rather, section 2244(a) substitutes the remedy provided by 






 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2002). 
 
113
 Id. at 375, n.7. 
 
114
 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). 
 
115
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 
 
116
 Webster v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 764, 768–69 (7th Cir. 2014) reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, 769 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 2014) on reh’g en banc 
sub nom. Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Harris v. 
Warden, 425 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 2005) (Judge Easterbrook noting the 
possible jurisdictional grants). 
 
117
 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a). 
 
118
 E.g., In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The principal 
question we must decide is when if ever a federal prisoner can use the habeas 
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2254, to get around the bar that the 
Antiterrorism Act places athwart successive motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
the federal prisoner’s habeas corpus substitute.”); Morales v. Bezy, 499 F.3d 
668, 670 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The remedy created by section 2255 is a substitute 
for habeas corpus for federal prisoners; section 2241 backs it up.”); United 
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So where does this leave us?  Section 2244 does not 
make the preconditions for obtaining authorization for a 
successive petition under section 2255(h) jurisdictional.  
Gonzalez makes clear that only a prisoner’s failure to seek or 
obtain authorization from a court of appeals deprives a 
district court of jurisdiction over a successive petition.  Once 
the prisoner has filed for and obtained authorization, he has 
cleared the lone jurisdictional hurdle.
119
  Any requirements 
for obtaining authorization are just that—threshold 
conditions for when authorization may be granted.  Thus, if 
the government waives an argument regarding whether a 
prisoner’s request to file a successive application meets the 
requirements of section 2255(h)(2), the court of appeals does 
not need to determine for itself whether the requirements are 
satisfied. 
2. Section 2255 
This still leaves, however, the possibility that section 
2255(h) itself is jurisdictional.  It’s helpful here to view 
2255(h) in its entirety: 
(h) A second or successive motion must be certified as 
provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate 
court of appeals to contain— 
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in 
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty 
of the offense; or 
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 




This language—particularly the requirement that a “second 
or successive motion must be certified . . . to contain”—does 
not satisfy Arbaugh’s “readily administrable bright line” rule 
for when a requirement is jurisdictional.  Congress has not 
“clearly state[d] that [this] threshold limitation . . . count[s] 
as jurisdictional.”
121
  The provision “does not speak in 
 
States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 264 (4th Cir. 2005) (“§ 2255 itself serves as 
the relevant substitute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
119
 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 650 (2012) (“Once a judge has made 
the determination that a COA is warranted and resources are deployed in 




 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 
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 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006). 




The closest section 2255(h) comes to imposing a 
jurisdictional requirement is when it states that a motion 
“must be certified.”  But the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that mandatory language without more is not 
jurisdictional.
123
  Compared to other provisions in section 
2255, section 2255(h) uses less jurisdictional language: 
Section 2255(h) says a motion “must be certified to contain,” 
whereas section 2255(e) provides that a habeas petition 
“shall not be entertained.”  Many of the reasons why section 
2255(h)(1) and (2) should not be viewed as jurisdictional, 
such as their legal character, also counsel against reading 
section 2255(h) as a jurisdictional bar. 
If a court disagrees, however, and believes that the 
“must be certified” language in section 2255(h) is 
jurisdictional, it still might be able to treat subsections 
2255(h)(1) and (2) as nonjurisdictional preconditions by 
relying on Gonzalez.  To be sure, there are some structural 
differences between section 2255 and section 2253, which 
was at issue in Gonzalez. Here, parts (1) and (2) are 
disjunctive subparts of (h), whereas in Gonzalez, the 
nonjurisdictional (c)(2) and (c)(3) were not subparts of (c)(1), 
although they did refer to and incorporate that provision.  
But section 2255(h)(2) is still functionally analogous to 
section 2253(c)(2); they both stipulate conditions that must 
be fulfilled in order to obtain an order from the court of 
appeals.  Saying that the petition must be certified to 
contain an element (as in section 2255(h)) is nearly 
equivalent to saying that certification is only permissible 
where a certain element can be shown (as in section 
2253(c)). 
CONCLUSION 
We’ve attempted to show that the preconditions for 
obtaining authorization to file a successive petition are not 
jurisdictional.  Our argument also has implications for the 
circuit split on whether other requirements on successive 
post-conviction petitions in section 2255 are jurisdictional.  








 See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 439 (2011) (“It is true 
that § 7266 is cast in mandatory language, but we have rejected the notion 
that ‘all mandatory prescriptions, however emphatic, are . . . properly typed 
jurisdictional.’”). 
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limitations, for example, is jurisdictional.
124
  Other courts 
have held that section 2255(e), which bars prisoners from 
bringing petitions for habeas corpus under section 2241 
unless section 2255’s provisions for successive petitions are 
inadequate, is jurisdictional.
125
  Some of our arguments for 
why the conditions on successive petitions are not 





 United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632 (2015) (“[W]e 
have made plain that most time bars are nonjurisdictional . . . . Congress 
must do something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a 
statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it.”). 
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 See sources supra cited note 11. 
